The Decision-Maker

London
August 2006

  by Ken Feltman and Louis-Lyonel Voiron

Perhaps all we need to know about the United Kingdom's difficulties in assimilating immigrants can be found in the recent World Cup competition. Note that there was no team from the United Kingdom.

We don't mean that the United Kingdom's team did not qualify; We mean that there was no team representing the U.K. One of the four teams from the United Kingdom - England - qualified. Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales fielded squads but failed to qualify for the competition in Germany.

How does it happen that the U.K. fields four teams when other countries have just one? It has to do with the ancient animosity between the Anglo-Saxons and the Celts (who inhabited the land before the invasions of various Germanic tribes).

Back to the beginning of the Dark Ages

This is not recent history. This goes back to the beginning of the Dark Ages. The legend of King Arthur is rooted in this period when Roman administration was replaced by Saxon and Danish warlords throughout today's England. The Celts were pushed to the fringes of the land, where they make up the majority of the population to this day. All these centuries later, the peoples of these two islands have not sorted it out. Yes, they remain peoples; they are not yet a people.

What about other countries? They have ethnic strife but all but one other European nation managed to put it aside for the competition. Italy's team included players from all parts of the country, including the autonomous regions, such as Sicily and Sardinia.

France sent a team with a majority of players from the restless, discontented areas. Even fractious Spain sent a national team, with separatist regions such as Catalonia and the Basque regions included.

But England remains unable to get its supposedly subdued Celtic neighbors to join in a common team. London has been selected to host the 2012 Olympics and efforts are underway to have a team representing the U.K. Northern Ireland has agreed to join with England in a common team but Scotland and Wales have declined. So much for national unity.

The World Cup's other example of ethnic fissures involved players who kept playing together even after their country split. Serbia-Montenegro fielded a team in Germany. Then, mid-tournament, Montenegro voted to separate from Serbia. The team was left playing for a country that had ceased to exist.

Immigration seems to make any nation's existing ethnic tensions worse. Britain exemplifies this tendency. The most recent European Conflict Index, a part of Radnor's Decision-Maker Research, demonstrates why Britain may be approaching a flashpoint. The Conflict Index included analysis of three different types of focus groups:

• groups composed of and moderated by native born, non-Muslim Britons (called Traditional British in this report);
   
• groups composed of and moderated by British Muslims, both immigrants and Muslims born in the U.K. (called Muslim in this report); and
  
• mixed groups of Muslims and non-Muslims, with mixed moderators (called Mixed).

The results should alarm Britons. The Conflict Index shows that the anti-Muslim sentiment increasingly evident throughout Europe, and documented especially in the Netherlands and France, is rising in Britain and taking a similar virulent form. But the British have an additional worry. Muslims in Britain are in no mood to change or assimilate. In fact, they want the Traditional British to change.

Fact: Participants in Muslim focus groups - those attended and conducted solely by Muslims - generally agreed that it was reasonable for Muslims to expect British society to 'accommodate' Muslim views and practices. The Muslims wanted the native British to 'accept' them but also let them alone to pursue their Muslim culture.

Fact: Muslims spoke frequently of their resentment of attempts to assimilate Muslims into the general British population. They saw this as 'intimidating,' 'prejudiced' and 'misguided.' They criticized Traditional Britons as 'racists' and 'exploiters.'

Fact: Traditional British focus groups - attended and conducted exclusively by non-Muslims - resisted the idea that Britain needed to change and supported the idea that the Muslims must adapt. The Traditional British were especially vitriolic in condemning the 'isolated' Muslims and expressing fear that isolation leads to Muslim terrorism. This follows the pattern found among traditional French and Dutch citizens, but with an important difference.

Fact: The Dutch are willing to consider that their own attitudes or behavior may exacerbate the problem. The French may be ready to do so even if their tradition of Jacobinism - the pursuit of centralism and equality - calls for unified treatment. Traditional British are much more rigid in wanting immigrants to adapt to the common culture. They now see non-conformity as rebellious and risky.

Fact: Muslims in Britain are much more willing to voice displeasure with their treatment by the majority and a few are willing to make incendiary statements. It seems clear from the responses that many recent Muslim immigrants feel entitled to live in the U.K. in a separate status that will protect them from mainstream British culture and influence. This is a volatile combination.

The French, and especially the Dutch, have shown decreasing tolerance for Muslim isolation and for Muslims who cling to traditional Muslim behavior. In Britain, too, there was general agreement among Traditional British that Muslims must adapt. The reason given most often is that unassimilated Muslims create too great a risk to the public to allow them to remain in Britain.

This attitude seems to mark the end of a long period characterized by a sharp rise of multiculturalism in British society and a surprising tolerance for extremist activities on British soil. Last year's terrorist attacks may have played a role in this evolution.

A different dynamic

Mixed groups of Muslims and non-Muslims show a very different dynamic. It is a dynamic that may give Muslims a false belief that their views are accepted by some Britons. The non-Muslim participants were much more accommodating toward the Muslim culture and used words and phrases connoting understanding and acceptance of the idea of Muslim separatism. They also tended to let pass charges of racism or religious intolerance leveled by Muslim participants.

This muting of opinions by the Traditional British contrasted markedly with the attitudes expressed in the Muslim groups. Perhaps most disturbing, attitudes of the Muslim participants did not change as much in the Mixed groups from the attitudes expressed in Muslim-only groups. In only a few instances did hostile statements by Muslims in Mixed groups cause a backlash from the non-Muslims.

Possibly, this encouraged the Muslims to escalate their rhetoric and racially intimidating comments. A few Muslim participants justified violence or even terrorism if not allowed to develop their own culture and impose Islamic law, or sharia.

Fact: Four in ten British Muslims (native born as well as newcomers) want sharia to be introduced into parts of the U.K. Non-Muslim immigrants, on the other hand, reflect attitudes very similar to the Traditional British population.

Sadly, The Conflict Index shows that this is an issue involving Muslims, not immigrants. Recent Muslim immigrants and Muslims born in Britain hold similar views and evidence hostility toward the prevailing British culture. They are far less willing to compromise or adjust than Muslims in the Netherlands or France.

The risk of polarization

Radnor's Media Analysis recently showed a similar level of polarization in the British and Muslim media:

• On one hand, a growing portion of the British Muslim community relies exclusively on Muslim media to get information. In today's Britain, more British Muslims watch an English language-Muslim TV channel than the BBC and more read the news from the Middle East in the Muslim press than in the national newspapers. Yet extensive reporting in these Muslim media of international conflicts, natural disasters, and political, economic and socio-cultural issues tends to increase the awareness among British Muslims of an umma transcending nation-states, and their bewilderment within British society.
   
• On the other hand, national newspapers offer little coverage for the British Muslim community. Radnor's Media Analysis found that eight in ten articles on Islam in the British press frame it as a foreign, not a domestic, phenomenon. Beside, a majority of articles tend to see Islam as a threat to Britain's security and values rather than as an asset in an increasingly globalized world. Tabloids and conservative publications typically show little interest in minority issues. More liberal broadsheets, though having more interest in Muslim issues, also reject Muslim ideas as offensive to traditional values.

Lastly, Radnor's Blog Monitoring also indicates a high degree of hostility by Muslims toward the country they live in, and a level of profound anger among non-Muslim Britons toward the Muslim community within the U.K.

Such a polarization represents a major risk for Britain's cohesion. A Government report that Radnor managed to access identified polarization between Pakistani/Bangladeshi and white communities as an important factor in the riots that shocked the U.K. in 2001.

The risk of increased tensions

Based upon this hostility and misunderstanding between Muslims and the general British population, Radnor predicts that Britain is headed toward more devisiveness, and possibly toward new instances of home-grown terrorism.

Our findings confirm those of quantitative analysis and of research conducted by the British Government. Just a fortnight after the attacks of 7/7 against the public transportation system, an online poll of British Muslims published by The Daily Telegraph acted as a wake-up call, triggering serious worries among the British public. People were alarmed to learn some of the results:

• One in two British Muslims said that they understood why terrorists behave that way;
   
• One in four felt sympathy for the terrorists' feelings and motives; and
   
• One in 15 (10,000 people) insisted that the bombings were fully justified.

Dr. Anthony King, one of Britain's best known and most respected political scientists, called these results truly 'alarming.' Critics soon dismissed those findings, arguing that online polling did not allow a true random sample and made it easier for respondents to go against the perceived national mood on sensitive issues where ethnicity may matter. They were quickly disabused of their optimism.

Other research projects, conducted using different methodologies, confirmed a similar degree of radicalization and alienation among British Muslims to British society. Three concentric circles of attitudes toward terrorism seemed to exist:

• Broad tolerance: One in four British Muslims felt it was right to fight with the Taliban and held that there was justification in the Koran for the London bombers' action;
   
• Deep conviction: One in six British Muslims thought their cause was right and agreed with suicide bombings against British military targets; and
   
• True empathy: One in ten British Muslims were ready to call the London suicide bombers martyrs, agreeing with their acts and believing that further attacks were justified.

Even if a majority of British Muslims are optimistic about their potential to integrate and are unlikely to provide the radicals with moral support, let alone safe havens, the research on active engagement in terrorism is extremely worrying:

• One in 100 British Muslims declare themselves willing, possibly even eager, to embrace violence in an effort to bring an end to what they see as decadent western societies, whether at home or abroad. This proportion is quite consistent with the assessment by British intelligence of about 15,000 extremists actively engaged in terrorist activities or supporting such activities.
   
• One in 50 British Muslims would be proud if a family member decided to join Al-Qaida, with another one in six remaining indifferent to Al-Qaida participation.

It is hard to draw a profile of these individuals. Apparently, men are more eager than women to engage in terrorist activities. Underachievers with few or no qualifications for good employment, often with no known terrorist leanings and no criminal background, are as likely as well-educated Muslims targeted by recruiters to be attracted to extremism.

On the other side, the attitude of non-Muslims is hardening, as shown by a growing interest in radical opinions or policies such as those supported by the nationalistic United Kingdom Independence Party or - further to the right - by the xenophobic British National Party. In our opinion, these cleavages are likely to deepen possibly past the point of compromise.

Detecting a dangerous pattern

How valid are these conclusions? We hope they are too extreme and that the situation is not so difficult as it seems. Nevertheless, previous success in forecasting unanticipated events makes us more confident that our analysis is accurate. The Conflict Index has proved right on other occasions where its findings were initially criticized as too counter-intuitive.

Indeed, analysis similar to that used in the U.K. for this report allowed Radnor to predict the stalemated German election last year. Focus group participants were clearly disenchanted with the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. They were willing to give challenger Angela Merkel a chance but did not like her doctrinaire right-wing allies. Radnor predicted the close election and the Grand Coalition (not seen in Germany since the 1960s) that would result from the voters' ambivalence.

The same methodology allowed Radnor to predict in April that the Dutch government would soon collapse due to the widening gulf between the political class in charge and the public. The government fell in late June.

Earlier, Radnor predicted the reelection of French President Chirac over one year before he was reelected; the appointment of de Villepin a year before he was selected as French prime minister; and - 16 months ago - the inability of the Chirac right-of-center coalition to maintain power through the 2007 election. A year ago, Radnor predicted the rise of Socialist Royal (who now leads public opinion polls) and the possible return of former Prime Minister Jospin, despite his low appeal in polls. In June Jospin announced that he may seek the French presidency.

Britain could be the site of the next bloodstained clash. Radnor has already advised clients with interests in Britain of the potential danger and has suggested ways to avoid business or personal loss should Britain experience new attacks or riots similar to those that exploded in Birmingham in 2001.

Beyond the risk assessment, the dynamic we observe calls for a strengthened and probably renewed approach from the British government, if the government is to have any realistic chance to avoid more violence. The Conservative opposition is also obliged to rise to the challenge and avoid the actions and rhetoric that inflame passions.

The United Kingdom could be in for difficult times. .

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copyright © 2006 Radnor Inc.